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 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
While necessary for roadways, work zones present a safety risk to work crew. Between 2005 and 2010, 
733 road workers died at work zones, half of them due to collisions with motorists intruding on the work 
zone (FHWA, 2015). Therefore, addressing these intrusions is an important step for ensuring a safe work 
environment for crewmembers. These intrusions have been documented to occur in most types of work 
zone operations, including lane and shoulder operations, flagger operations, mobile operations, and 
traffic control setup and removal operations (Ullman et al., 2011). These statistics are based on work 
zone crash data, intrusions may be more likely to occur due to weather and lighting factors, road 
geometry factors, traffic calming measures, and driver factors (e.g., demographics and impairment). 
However, a recent research synthesis at the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT, 2015) 
found that few states had an explicit method for systematically collecting work zone intrusion data. 
Without this data, any policy or design recommendations made to mitigate intrusions and improve 
worker safety will not be grounded in significant empirical, verifiable information. The purpose of this 
work zone intrusion interface design project was to design an efficient, comprehensive, and user-
friendly reporting system for intrusions in work zones. The information collected by this system could 
then be used to examine risk factors and areas of interest to reduce intrusions and risk to workers, 
disseminate feedback to workers and Department of Transportation administration on safety data, and 
provide an empirical basis for design changes to work zones and future policy recommendations to the 
state government. 
To design a usable system (Wickens et al., 2004) for work zone intrusions, designers must do the 
following: 
(1) Understand the characteristics of the typical user (in this case, work zone supervisors).  
(2) Develop common or typical intrusion scenarios for realistic testing of the system.  
(3) Conduct iterative testing with typical users (supervisors and crew) and incorporate revisions 
based on the results of the tests.  
To understand the supervisors and crew, the research team at HumanFIRST conducted semi-structured 
interviews with work zone supervisors from rural and urban locations across the state (Baxter, St. Cloud, 
Duluth, and Cedar Ave. stations). Crews and supervisors conceptually understood an intrusion as a 
vehicle entering the work area cordoned off by cones, but considered an intrusion as practically 
reportable if the intrusion happened near the activity area threatening active workers or if it threatened 
a flagger. Furthermore, they considered the primary reportable elements of an intrusion to be the 
layout, environmental conditions (e.g., weather), location, time, road condition, maneuvers made by 
intruding vehicle, and work zone operation type. The research team at HumanFIRST extracted the 
qualitative information from these interviews and codified it into a task analysis of a prototypical 
intrusion reporting sequence, which informed the initial design of the prototype intrusion report. 
The HumanFIRST research team designed four typical intrusion scenarios to test the prototype reporting 
interface. Those scenarios were reviewed and verified by MnDOT work zone supervisors with minor 
revisions. The team conducted a series of usability tests across multiple phases with evolving designs of 
 the intrusion reporting interface. The usability test sessions had users input into the intrusion report 
system either a researcher-generated intrusion scenario or a vividly recalled intrusion event that the 
crewmember or supervisor directly experienced. In later phases, video recordings of real intrusions on 
MnDOT roads were used. Participants verbalized their thoughts as they interacted with the interface, 
and the time to complete each report was recorded. Following the reports, supervisors and crew then 
answered questions and filled out questionnaires to clarify the difficulty and usability of the intrusion 
report interface. 
Initially, the team tested 6 users across Maple Grove, Cedar Avenue, and Bemidji. This first phase of 
usability testing led to a finalized prototype, which was implemented by HumanFIRST into a working 
online beta reporting system hosted by the University of Minnesota. Furthermore, a paper version of 
the interface was implemented to supplement the online electronic beta interface. A second round of 
usability tests with 4 work zone supervisors across Minnesota led to a second revision of the beta 
interface (both electronic and paper). Some takeaway points from the first two phases were: 
Supervisors liked drop-down menus, comprehensiveness of the reporting system, and that it was 
relatively quick to use, but they did not necessarily see the rationale for reporting intrusions, particularly 
minor intrusions in which there was no risk to crew. 
In response to the issue with minor intrusions, the HumanFIRST team incorporated a third major 
revision to the beta interface by splitting up the reporting decision flow into an immediate “basic” 
report, and a comprehensive “full” report, based on whether there was a reported risk to crew onsite at 
the work zone. This major revision was incorporated into the online and paper forms, and was then 
user-tested with a laptop, portable tablet, and the paper form. The final round of user testing on this 
finalized design version of the reporting interface had good usability scores, difficulty scores, and time to 
completion scores. 
The final version of the work zone intrusion reporting interface should be, based on the results of 
testing, user-friendly and effective. During implementation by MnDOT, those responsible for 
administration should be aware that the primary benefit of the online or digital interface is that it should 
be easy and quick to access in the field, allowing a supervisor or head crewperson on site to rapidly 
report a work zone intrusion and go about their business. Furthermore, if MnDOT wants reliable and 
consistent intrusion reporting, an effort to engage work zone supervisors and crewmembers in the 
benefits, consequences, and decision-making process is essential to the success of the intrusion 
reporting system. Communication should be made on a widespread and consistent basis about the 
current and recent data on intrusions, data trends, and what changes are being made as a result of the 
intrusion reporting. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Work zone intrusions are a serious safety concern for crew workers, as motorists are known to breach 
the boundaries of construction, maintenance, and mobile operations. Understanding the factors that 
contribute to work zone intrusions is largely unknown because the method and standards for capturing 
data surrounding the events statewide and nationally are not well established, according to a recent 
transportation research synthesis (CTC, 2015). In the absence of information, little action can be taken 
to reduce the frequency of intrusions and address this worker safety risk. From 2005 to 2010, the U.S. 
suffered the loss of 733 road workers, approximately half struck by motorists (FHWA, 2015). Motorists 
are also injured or killed by intrusion crashes, adding to the urgency for an understanding of intrusion 
causes.  
Addressing intrusions is an important step toward ensuring a safe work environment for work crews on 
our roadways. Due to the limited data collected regarding work zone intrusion, this review must 
preliminarily focus on work zone crashes to determine which factors are most likely to be linked to 
intrusions. The following summary highlights the current practices for defining and documenting work 
zone intrusions and the current risk factors of work zone crashes and potential intrusions to assist in the 
identification of which information is most important to collect in documenting intrusions in Minnesota. 
1.1.1 Reporting Work Zone Intrusions  
A recent transportation research synthesis submitted to the Minnesota DOT (MnDOT, 2015) provided a 
survey of work zone reporting practices across 19 states. Only three states at the time collected work 
zone intrusion information (Pennsylvania, North Dakota, and Iowa). The reported information includes 
incident description, time, date, and location details, a diagram and vehicle count, rate of similar events 
at the location, and any actions taken. Other details reported by individual states include weather, the 
presence of law enforcement, and injury/damage. The report (MnDOT, 2015) also noted that work zone 
intrusion reporting was not as formalized or as complete as reporting for injuries or crashes, and that 
intrusion reporting was seen as a burden on top of the other responsibilities of safety managers or 
supervisors. 
The primary means of reporting for the three states were by PDF sheets that allowed for electronic 
entry and submission, although there is some shifting toward handheld devices such as iPads in Iowa. 
Oregon, although not recording intrusion data at the time of the report, reported that the state will 
employ smart technologies in the near future. These technologies include high definition cameras that 
can be date/time stamped and organized with GPS coordinates (MnDOT, 2015). 
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1.1.2 Defining Work Zone Intrusions  
Work zone intrusions can be largely divided into two categories: those that occur intentionally and those 
that occur unintentionally. A study of work zone intrusion crash reports from New York identified 
deliberate intrusions when it was reported the driver turned into a driveway, intersection, or exit 
through a work zone, followed a work vehicle into a work zone, or refused to comply with instructions 
after interacting with flaggers, for example, driving into the lane after being told to wait (Ullman, Finley, 
& Theiss, 2011). While risk taking, like drunk driving or speeding, can certainly co-occur with deliberate 
intrusions, non-deliberate intrusions are often the result of losing control of the vehicle, confusion, 
distraction or inattention, or avoiding a crash of another kind. The factors that are attributed to these 
types of intrusions and crashes can vary greatly from environmental conditions to human factors. 
1.1.3 Intrusions by Work Zone Type 
Various types of work zones and the areas within them can differentially impact the risk of work zone 
intrusions and crashes. Road segments with narrow lanes, reduce cross sections, closed lanes or 
otherwise changes to the roadway force drivers to perform maneuvers they may not otherwise perform, 
and more importantly, may require them to modify their driving in a way in which they may fail to 
comply (Venugupal & Tarko, 2000; Bella, 2005). Work zone intrusions have been documented and 
categorized to occur within: lane and shoulder operations, flagger operations, mobile operations, and 
traffic control setup and removal operations (Ullman et al., 2011). 
1.1.3.1 Lane and Shoulder Operations 
Lane and shoulder operations are at great risk for intrusion and crash, in part, due to the sheer length of 
the work area and increased exposure to the travelling public. Long work zones add risk due to the 
increased exposure; however, shorter work zones may present more extreme speed differentials, which 
are more likely to disrupt traffic flow and result in crashes (Khattak et al., 2002). Stationary lane and 
shoulder operations in highways also result in more severe work zone injuries than those in city streets 
and more than mobile work zones (Wong, Arico, & Rivani, 2011). While precise data is not always 
available regarding crashes at different points within the work zone, clearly documenting the accurate 
location can provide useful insight into the different factors at hand throughout the zone. Work areas 
can be divided into four (MUTCD) to six (MMUCC) areas depending on the criterion being used: -2) 
Before the First Work Zone Sign, -1) After the First Work Zone Sign, 1) Advanced Warning Area, 2) 
Transition Area, 3) Activity Area, and 4) Termination Area (Dissanayake & Akepati, 2009). Garber and 
Zao (2001) reported that 70% of crashes occur in the Activity Area and few occur within the Termination 
Area, while Dissanayake and Akepati (2009) reported that 40-57% of crashes occur in the Activity Area. 
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The likelihood of sideswipe crashes increases in the Transition Area, likely due to increased lane 
changing behavior in this area (Garber & Zao, 2001).  
1.1.3.2 Flagger Operations 
Flaggers appear to be at greatest risk of being struck compared to other workers in the work zone. In 
Wisconsin between 2000 and 2010, over twice as many flaggers (i.e., 13) were struck compared to other 
workers in the work zone (Yu et al., 2013). Of those flaggers, 23% were indirectly struck when one 
vehicle was pushed into the worker as a result of being rear-ended by another vehicle. Ullman and 
colleagues (2011) found that 64% of intrusions that occurred at flagger operations were caused by 
deliberate actions of drivers. Most common were instances where motorists who were instructed to 
stop decided to unlawfully ignore the directions and drive around the flagger. Otherwise, motorists 
documented in the report unintentionally entered the work area, most often from being caught off-
guard by the traffic conditions. 
1.1.3.3 Mobile Operations 
Mobile work zone intrusions that result in a crash appear to be infrequent; however, the frequency at 
which intrusions occur within them without resulting in a crash is unclear. A study of New York work 
zone crashes from 1993 to 1998 found that only 20% of intrusion crashes occurred in mobile work 
zones, while stationary work zones accounted for the remaining 80% (Bryden, Andrew, Fortuniewicz, 
2000). It is unclear to what extent exposure may influence these percentages since stationary work 
zones are likely to outnumber mobile operations in both frequency counts and hours of operation. 
Deliberate intrusions in mobile operations appear to be infrequent; however, the documented cases 
involving crashes in mobile work zones are rare, providing few data points to draw firm conclusions. Two 
of the eight intrusion crashes in mobile work zones in New York were deemed deliberate where 
motorists chose to pull in between two work vehicles in the convoy (Ullman et al., 2011). The remaining 
unintentional intrusions were the result of motorists misjudging the speed or distance of the convoy or, 
in one case, being forced into the convoy to avoid a crash. 
1.1.3.4 Traffic Control Setup and Removal Operations 
However infrequent, workers appear to be at a risk while they are in the process of setting up or 
removing traffic control devices or work zone boundaries. Two Wisconsin workers were struck while 
setting temporary traffic control devices between 2000 and 2010 (Yu et al., 2013). Similarly, nine crashes 
were documented in New York involving setup or removal operations (Ullman et al., 2011). A third was 
due to deliberate actions by drivers (e.g., choosing to pass the convoy on the shoulder or entered into 
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the convoy during cone retrieval). The remaining two-thirds were unintentional, but largely the result of 
inattentive driving. 
1.1.4 Environmental Risks 
1.1.4.1 Lighting and Weather Factors in Work Zone Crashes 
Work zones are at a heightened risk under poor visibility conditions, such as at night or during inclement 
weather (Garber & Woo, 1990). Fatal crash risk in maintenance work zones is greatest under dark 
conditions, contrasted by construction and utility work zones, which are under greatest risk of fatal 
crash in daylight (Weng & Meng, 2011) and non-peak daylight hours (Wong et al., 2011). This 
discrepancy may be attributed to the most likely hours that work tends to occur. Nighttime work has 
compounding effects with drivers since not only are they operating under poorer visibility, but they are 
also more likely to be driving fatigued or distracted (McAvoy, Schattler, & Datta, 2007). Drowsy drivers 
or drivers engaged in a long, boring trip have slower reaction times and are less likely to detect hazards.  
Moreover, drowsy drivers have been demonstrated to perform equally or worse than drivers at the 
legally acceptable level of alcohol intoxication (Dawson & Reid, 1997). This is important to note if a long 
stretch of roadway must be traveled prior to reaching a work zone since drivers who finally reach it may 
likely be tired, travelling at high speeds, or both. 
Approximately 78% of work zone crashes in Minnesota occur during the day and under clear conditions 
since a majority of work occurs in the summer months when daylight and accommodating weather are 
maximized (Minnesota Crash Facts, 2013). Adverse weather, however infrequent, does increase the risk 
of more serious crashes compared to clear weather conditions (Katta, 2013). This is likely due to poor 
vehicle control on wet surfaces, but may have a protective effect on work zones since drivers are more 
likely to reduce their speeds in inclement weather. 
Investigations of work zone intrusion crashes have shown that when a vehicle intrudes into a work area, 
the likelihood that it will strike a worker is less (9%) than the likelihood it will strike work equipment or 
vehicles (53%) (Bryden et al., 2000). However, a follow up investigation for New York from 2000-2005 
found the percent of worker strikes increased to 30% of all intrusion crashes if they occurred at night 
(Ullman, Finley, Bryden, Srinivasan, & Council, 2008). 
The lighting conditions of the work zone site itself is also an important factor in the margin of risk. Poorly 
lit work zones (i.e., limited or no lighting) have been found to be associated with increased fatal crash 
risk and this is more profound than when compared to poorly lit non-work zone roadways (Li & Bai, 
2008; Daniel, Dixon, & Jared, 2000). The safety risk of work zones at night can be ameliorated by 
increasing the conspicuity of the area through retroreflective materials (e.g., alternating orange and 
white stripes) to increase the visibility of workers, signs, barrels, and barriers (McAvoy et al., 2007). 
Properly placing the reflective material on workers and vehicles can help best ensure that motorists 
properly detect them at night. Simply adding retroreflective striping to workers’ thighs significantly 
increased the distance at which drivers could react to their presence, with the best performing 
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placement being at the vest, elbows, wrists, knees, and ankles (Wood, Marszalek, Lacherez, & Tyrrell, 
2014, see Figure 1.1).   
 
 
Figure 1.1 Adapted graph and images from Wood et al. (2014) depicting response distances corresponding with 
four different retroreflective stripping compositions on workers. 
Retroreflective tape on work vehicles can also help to increase conspicuity at night. Motorists may have 
difficulty, however, determining the stopped or slow status of work trucks at night, in the absence of 
other visual cues, if the work trucks are parked or travelling parallel to the movement of traffic. 
Motorists have been shown to have a faster reaction time if vehicles are parked in a diagonal or 
“echelon” position relative to traffic (Langham, Hole, Edwards, & O’Neil, 2002). 
Lastly, proper maintenance of surfaces used to increase visibility is important for safety. Reflective 
materials and striping can help to increase the visibility of workers, signs, barrels, and barriers; however, 
dust created by construction activities, road debris, dents and tears in the retro-reflective sheeting, over 
time, reduce visibility (McAvoy et al., 2007). 
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1.1.4.2 Road Geometry 
Horizontal and vertical curves pose a risk to drivers on all roadways; however, workers have been found 
to be at an especially high risk of being struck on vertical curve crests compared to the risk of general 
crashes on other similar road segments (Yu, Bill, Chitturi, & Noyce, 2013). Straight road segments have 
been shown to be associated with decreased crash severity, further identifying the risk that curves have 
in work zone safety (Dias, 2015). The role that roadway grade has in work zone crash risk is more unclear 
with some studies finding a link between crash risk and curved segments (Dias, 2015) and some stating 
that straight-level roadways present the greatest risk (Harb, Radwan, Yan, Pande, & Abdel-Aty, 2008). 
Roadways that may be perceived to be safer tend to result in greater risk because they may actually 
promote risker driving behaviors, like speeding, since motorists feel safer to do so. This risk-taking 
behavior is often linked to reasons why average speeds and crash rates are higher on divided roadways 
compared to undivided roadways (McAvoy, Duffy, & Whitney, 2011). Undivided roadways, however, 
also experience high-speed crashes since traffic density tends to be light and the perceived risk of traffic 
enforcement is low (Daniel et al., 2000; Li & Bai, 2008). 
Other typical roadway factors that are associated with increased fatal crash risk in work zones include 
local and arterial roads (rather than interstate highways or freeways), asphalt paved roads, and typically 
those with speed limits of 60 mph or greater (Harb, Radwan, Yan, Pande, & Abdel-Aty, 2008; Li & Bai, 
2008). 
1.1.4.3 Traffic Calming Measures 
Traditional approaches to speed management have been through the use of clearly marked speed limit 
signs. Unfortunately, research has found that work zone and speed limit signs are largely ignored by 
motorists in work zones (Fontaine et al., 2001). Variable Message Signs (VMS) are an alternative 
approach to alerting motorists to safe travel speeds given the conditions of the road (e.g., crashes, 
traffic congestion, road surface conditions, etc.; Lin, Kang & Chang, 2004). Moreover, VMS are successful 
in encouraging better compliance to the posted speed limit, which results in less speed variability and 
lower crash rates over time (Committee for Guidance on Setting and Enforcing Speed Limits, 1998; 
Coleman et al., 1996; Lee, Hellinga, & Saccomanno, 2004). The traffic smoothing effect of VMS is even 
influential in reducing congestion leading to a traffic bottleneck formation of work zones (Lin et al., 
2004; Bertini, Boice, & Bogenberger, 2006). 
Altering the physical environment through vertical and horizontal deflections has been found to be an 
effective ecological solution to encouraging lower speeds in work zones. Speed bumps or cushions are 
effective methods for decreasing speed and crashes in low-speed roadways (e.g., 30 mph; Mountain, 
Hirst, & Maher, 2005). Similarly, pinch points, traffic islands, and round-abouts provide a protective 
effect of the roadways by reducing speeds and reducing conflict points between vehicles (Mountain et 
al., 2005).  
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Barricades are often implemented to mark construction and maintenance work zones (Daniel et al., 
2000), and channeling devices or drums have been demonstrated to help drivers safely navigate through 
a work zone, in turn, protecting workers and mitigating crash rates (McAvoy et al., 2007). Concrete 
barriers provide a degree of separation and protection between workers and motorists that can help to 
reduce the likelihood of intrusions. These barriers, however, are not feasible for all work zone 
operations. 
Incorrect driving responses to traffic-control devices or signage have been documented to result in work 
zone intrusions in cases where signs were missing or spaced too far apart, which led to confused drivers 
improperly selecting a lane-change point and inadvertently entering the activity area (Ullman et al., 
2011). However, Bai and Lee (2006) analyzed the risk factors to crashes in work zones from crash data in 
the Kansas Department of Transportation database and found the presence of significant and efficient 
traffic control can partially mitigate crash rate. With logistic regression analyses, they found that: the 
presence of flaggers reduced work zone crashes of male drivers by 15% and heavy trucks by 27%; and 
the presence of stop signs and stop signals reduced crashes caused by misunderstanding traffic control 
by 20%. These findings suggest that the presence of flaggers, and traffic signs or signals should be 
accounted for when reporting work zone intrusions. 
Finally, the season or time period appears to have a non-negligible impact on the occurrence of work 
zone crashes. Bai and Lee (2006) report that 18% of total crashes happened during the period of slow 
construction (December through March). They attribute this to a possible lack of routine inspection of 
work zones. The public may also have a lower expectancy of work zones, which may lead to 
unpreparedness upon encountering one. Related to lower expectancy, drivers were more likely to have 
more severe injuries in work zones for short-term (less than 1 day) stationary zones than longer-term 
stationary zones (Wong et al., 2011). 
1.1.5 Driver Behavior Risks 
1.1.5.1 Driver Characteristics 
Older drivers represent the second highest fatal crash rate per licensed driver, next to teen drivers on 
typical roadways and are the leading fatal crash risk group by vehicle mile traveled (see Figure 1.2; FARS, 
2010; Cicchino & McCartt, 2014). Unsurprisingly, older drivers are also most likely to be involved in a 
fatal work zone crash compared to younger drivers (Li & Bai, 2009; Weng & Meng, 2011). Time of day 
appears to play a role in the likelihood that a driver of a certain age group may be involved in a fatal 
crash, with older drivers most likely involved between 4:00 pm and 8:00 pm and 35 to 44 year olds 
between 8:00 pm and 6:00 am (Li & Bai, 2009). Interestingly, middle-aged drivers are at a 1.17 times 
greater risk to be involved in a fatal or injury crash in a construction work zone than younger drivers 
(Weng & Meng, 2011). Moreover, male drivers have been found to pose a greater fatal crash risk in 
work zones than female drivers (Li & Bai, 2009). Even male occupants are more likely to be killed in work 
zone crashes than their female counterparts (Dissanayake & Akepati, 2009). 
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Figure 1.2 National fatal passenger vehicle driver crash involvements per 100 million vehicle miles traveled by 
age group, 2007. Based on National Household Travel Survey VMT by Age and NHTSA FARS (Cicchino & McCartt, 
2014). 
1.1.5.2 Vehicle Characteristics 
Vehicle type has been found to impact crash risk in work zones. Drivers of older vehicles have been 
found to have a higher fatal crash risk compared to drivers of newer vehicles (Weng & Meng, 2011). 
While an overwhelmingly high proportion of work zone crashes involve passenger vehicles, trucks and 
buses have been shown to have anywhere between a four (Li & Bai, 2009) and ten (Weng & Meng, 
2011) times increase in fatal crash risk compared to other vehicles. Moreover, compared to non-work 
zones, the crashes in work zones are disproportionally more likely to involve trucks than other vehicles 
(Daniel et al., 2000). 
1.1.5.3 Risk-taking Behaviors 
Impairments of any kind (alcohol, drugs, fatigue, etc.) are likely to increase the likelihood of other 
problematic behaviors associated with work zone crashes. Driver impairment was cited in 25% of work 
zone intrusion crashes in New York (Bryden et al., 2000). 
Research examining work zone behaviors in Italy revealed that drivers were more likely to travel closer 
to the posted speed limit when the travelling lane was narrowed (Bella, 2005). It appears, then, that the 
drivers were less likely to abide by the posted reduced speed limit if the work zone did not appear to 
necessitate it, which deemed the signage unreliable or unreasonable. Other studies have similarly 
shown that drivers will self-select a travel speed, regardless of the posted speed, and will reject 
artificially low speed limits (McAvoy et al., 2011). This may partially explain why more than 50% of fatal 
crashes in work zones occur at work zones that are idle (Daniel et al., 2000) since drivers are less likely to 
feel compelled to abide by speed limits and signage when no workers or activity are present. 
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Next to impairment, speeding or traveling too fast for conditions is at the forefront of hazardous 
behaviors that increase crash risk. Both crash risk and crash severity increase with speed (Mountain et 
al., 2005; Wilson, Hendrikz, Le Brocque, & Bellamy, 2006). Travelling too fast for conditions or speeding 
was cited as a factor in approximately 17% of worker strikes in Wisconsin analyzed by Yu and colleagues 
(2013). Additionally, traffic density plays an important role in speed. Free-flowing traffic allows for 
higher traveling speeds leading to an increase in single vehicle crashes, while denser traffic is more 
susceptible to the impact of dangerous speed differentials (i.e., increased standard deviation in speed) 
between vehicles leading to an increase in two vehicle crashes (Daniel et al., 2000; Wilson et al., 2006; 
McAvoy et al., 2011). 
Related to driver speeding, drivers may misjudge distance or the speed of the convoy during mobile 
operations and end up intruding or impacting the convoy vehicle. Furthermore, drivers can misperceive 
the distance to traffic channeling devices during traffic control setup/removal, leading to a heightened 
risk of intrusions and collisions with the convoy (Ullman et al., 2011). Distance perception and rate of 
approach are key factors in avoiding work zone intrusions, and both are affected by speed of the driver 
and speed of the mobile convoy. 
Following speeding, inattention or distraction is typically the next commonly cited contributing factor to 
crashes. In 2013, approximately 18% of all work zone crashes in Minnesota cited inattention or 
distraction as a first or second contributing factor to the crash (Minnesota Crash Facts, 2013). Moreover, 
approximately 48% of worker strikes in Wisconsin included inattentive driving as a factor (Yu et al., 
2013). Drivers who are actively engaged in distraction or passively being inattentive to the task of 
driving are less likely to appropriately respond to hazards or changing conditions in the roadway, which 
is especially problematic in work zones where the margin of error is smaller than typical roadways. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, rear-end and sideswipe crashes are more likely to occur in work zones than 
non-work zones (Khattak et al., 2002). In examining New York intrusion crashes in lane closures, 
approximately one-fourth of the intrusions occurred because drivers were surprised, likely from 
inattentive or distracted driving, by stopped or slow traffic and either veered into the work zone to 
avoid the crash (8%), rear-ended the lead vehicle before entering the work zone (12%), or rear-ended 
the lead vehicle and consequently pushed it into the work zone (5%). Furthermore, a driver may not be 
distracted but in an attempt to avoid a sideswipe crash during merging or from the side lanes they may 
non-deliberately intrude into the work zone (Ullman et al., 2011). A similar pattern was also observed 
for flagger, mobile, and setup/removal operations, as well.  
Finally, drivers may choose to deliberately intrude into the work zone, not because of impairment or 
distraction, but because of the location of the zone. If the zone is proximate to a roadway exit, 
intersection, or the driveway of a residence, drivers may choose to intrude into the work zone to reach 
the location (Ullman et al., 2011). This choice may be due to lower risk perception of intrusions, or the 
urgency of reaching the exit, intersection, or driveway. 
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CHAPTER 2:  HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS 
2.1 OVERVIEW 
To design an effective interface for reporting work zone intrusions, the designer must have a reasonable 
understanding of the human factors of the work zone intrusion reporting task. This entails a solid 
understanding of the task characteristics, and human capabilities and limitations relevant to the job and 
task. The human factors team conducted interviews with work zone supervisors and workers employed 
in both urban and rural trucks station locations for day and night shifts to sample most task 
environments and conditions. Presented here are (1) interview summaries, (2) a task analysis, and (3) 
relevant human factors issues. 
2.1.1 Interview Summaries  
Interviews were conducted with supervisors and workers from Baxter, St. Cloud, Duluth, and Cedar Ave 
stations. Discussions at each truck station typically included multiple workers in the same room to add 
variety of thought and opinion and expedite the process.  Interviews were semi-structured with set 
questions and follow-up probes, along with brief proposed scenarios to the interviewees for engaging in 
cognitive walkthroughs. From these interviews, a number of key themes emerged that are relevant to 
describing the intrusion reporting task and its demands. 
2.1.1.1 Reporting Responsibilities and Interface 
Supervisors and lead crewmembers are usually notified in the event of an intrusion and perform the 
formal report to MnDOT. If the intrusion is especially severe, such as obvious drunk driving, workers in 
the area may call dispatch to immediately address the situation. If necessary, crewmembers could 
request a paper form (Work Zone Incident Report Form) for reporting from their supervisor. Some 
interviewees noted that this required step to go through a supervisor may present a barrier to reporting, 
a step that hinders workers from carrying out the process. 
For immediate reporting, a handheld or mobile system for reporting was considered possibly useful, 
either in the form of a smartphone or a tablet. However, a supervisor may not be on site with a tablet, 
requiring a reliance on memory for later engaging in the reporting task and details regarding the turn of 
events. Furthermore, there was concern about being held accountable for damaged tablet or 
smartphone screens. For reporting purposes, a camera (e.g., GoPro) for capturing either pictures or 
video could support memory and provide evidence for intrusions, similar to the practice of using 
cameras for documenting crashes in a work zone. 
If the reporting is done at a later date, the crew thought it best be integrated into their daily reporting 
sequence and prompted, instead of making it an extra step that has to be remembered (and easily 
forgotten). Suggested sequences include reporting during either their activities timesheet (RCA) or their 
daily asset management program (the upcoming TAMS). For example, the timesheet could ask if the 
worker had encountered an intrusion. Any additional reporting related to intrusions should be very 
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simple, short, and straightforward, ideally with box clicking. For crew, the reporting of intrusions is seen 
as a low priority in comparison with the other demands on their time and energy. 
2.1.1.2 Intrusion Definition and Reportable Characteristics 
The crew conceptually understood an intrusion as a vehicle entering the area cordoned off by cones. 
However, an intrusion is thought of as reportable in a practical sense if it occurs close to the activity area 
and threatens active workers, or if it threatens a flagger during flagging operations. A vehicle that failed 
to stop before a flagger could be considered an intrusion. Moreover, if aggressive drivers attempt to 
crowd or slowly advance toward a flagger, requiring the flagger to move or walk backward, this could be 
considered an intrusion as it forced the flagger to take “evasive maneuvers”.  
The key reportable elements of an intrusion from the crew are as follows: layout, environment (lighting 
and weather), location, time, location road condition, vehicle maneuvers, and operation type. The 
interviewees did not want to report any elements related to contributing factors focused on driver 
characteristics such as distraction, as this is an inference that cannot be directly observed, given that the 
crew frequently cannot see the drivers well and do not want to be liable for uncertain claims. When the 
crew directly interact with intruding drivers (typically at night), these drivers are either drunk, which 
typically leads to a call to dispatch, or lost, which normally does not get officially reported. 
LAYOUT 
Layout of the work zone was identified as an important characteristic to identify during reporting 
intrusions. Some interviewees reported almost never deviating from the manual layout, and only 
needed to know the road segment type to consult the manual and report which layout was used for a 
location. However, if there were enhancements or modifications done, this was typically reported. A 
typical modification occurs on lane closure at curves due to the nature of that layout, requiring a 
lengthening of the taper to facilitate merging. This leads to location being a relevant reportable element, 
as location influences both layout, driver behavior, and rate of intrusion. For example, exit ramps have a 
higher rate of intrusions due to driver confusion, while operations on bridges have relatively few 
intrusions. Another directly observable element was road condition, which could possibly contribute to 
unintentional intrusions due to loss of vehicle control. 
ENVIRONMENT 
The environment was relevant to the crew, although weather was thought to be somewhat misleading 
to report. Although the weather can be “clear”, there is usually no way to indicate complicating factors 
such as the position of the sun leading to glare and disrupting driver vision. Interviewees suggested 
adding a second reporting attribute in the environment to indicate whether lighting complicates the 
driving task. Besides time of day elements such as exact time and corresponding lighting levels, workers 
noted that light salience may be a reportable issue. Drivers’ attention may be drawn to flashing beacons 
or lit areas at night, causing them to not see workers on foot. These salience elements may need to be 
added on an intrusion form. 
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VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Vehicle characteristics, when observed, were thought to be important to report, particularly their 
maneuvers that are obvious. These include following too close or speeding, that is, behaviors that do 
not require inference on the part of the worker. Furthermore, the type of intruding vehicle is relevant 
for reporting as well. Commercial trucks, for example, can present a significant risk to both crew and 
public safety if intruding in a work zone, relative to a passenger vehicle. 
OPERATIONS 
Interviewees indicated that another item important to report was the type of operation. As previously 
described, intrusions during bridge operations and construction operations were infrequent, but non-
bridge maintenance operations and mobile operations had more frequent intrusions. Most frequent 
were intrusions on flagger operations.  
Flagger operations were particularly prone to intrusions. Flagging is often perceived as a low-level job; 
however, the flagger is often the first line of defense for crew safety. Flaggers are often physically and 
mentally exhausted during performance of their task and may be prone to distraction and/or 
inattention. As opposed to signalized traffic controls that receive high rates of compliance, flaggers 
often face driver violations and intrusions upon their safety, and interviewed crews suspected that 
drivers do not attribute significant regulatory authority to the human flagger. Interviewees reported that 
cameras (e.g., GoPro) for flaggers would be helpful for capturing these driver violations. Furthermore, 
some crew reported that some work zone signs are often outdated and unreliable, leading to a lack of 
trust and low compliance in the work zone. Moreover, workers reported that more specific signing 
regarding work activities (e.g., tree removal) would improve compliance to and trust in signage. 
2.1.1.3 Impedances and Incentives 
The primary barrier and incentive for reporting intrusions has been the severity of the intrusion itself. 
Intrusions that directly threatened workers were more likely to be reported in some fashion relative to 
minor intrusions that involved knocking over cones in the taper portion of the work zone. This is related 
to the constraint of time and work demands, which precludes reporting as other responsibilities are 
seen as taking a higher priority in an already demanding schedule. There is also the hierarchical nature 
of the job, in that, workers feel that they may be required to notify a supervisor who does the reporting 
instead of direct reporting the intrusion themselves. The perceived organizational structure of making 
this an extra step in the process could result in making the reporting act less likely. 
Lack of information provides a barrier on two fronts, both on the intrusion itself, and the effects of 
reporting an intrusion. On the first, crewmembers may not observe an intrusion occurring, just its 
effects, leading to a lack of significant reportable data outside of the appearance of an intrusion. Also, 
crew members usually do not know any contributing factors related to the driver because they did not 
directly interact with the driver. On the second, workers may not report because they believe reporting 
does not have any effect on higher level decision-making and has no immediate impact (especially in 
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terms of legal ramifications for the driver). They are unaware of any of the impacts the information 
about intrusion rates could have on MnDOT responses or legislation. 
The last primary barrier is the complexity and number of forms and entry documents. Forms are 
frequently marketed as taking a brief time to fill out, while actually taking a substantial amount of time 
to complete. Any final intrusion reporting form and interface should be as simple and straightforward as 
possible, while meeting MnDOT needs. 
Finally, some crewmembers discussed possible incentives to increase intrusion reporting rates. 
Reporting must have relevance in the eyes of workers, according to interviewees, which may include 
disseminating recognition of intrusion documentation and perhaps recognition of who submitted the 
reports, identifying and communicating action plans based on the data, outlining data trends, and 
possibly allowing workers to respond with comments and feedback on reports. Other minor incentives 
include gifts such as food, gift cards, special parking spots, or simple recognition for high volume 
submitters. 
2.1.2 Task Analysis 
Given that reporting of intrusions rarely happen outside of the event of a crash, the description of the 
task steps presented here are necessarily prototypical and suggestive. The description of the task takes 
the form of a hierarchical task analysis (HTA), which is defined by Stanton (2006) as a way of describing 
work systems in terms of goals, breaking down sub-steps in a hierarchy in terms of sub-goals, and linking 
the overall goals and sub-goals in a sequential manner. Once the steps and sub-steps are understood, an 
analyst can draw conclusions on what steps efficiencies and errors may occur. The information driving 
this HTA was derived from both the aforementioned interviews and known requirements from MnDOT. 
Furthermore, the concrete task elements of interacting with the system are omitted because the 
interface has not been developed yet. The suggested task components are outlined in the HTA 
representation in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Hierarchical Task Analysis of Intrusion Reporting 
Super-
ordinate 
Task component Notes 
1. Collect data on intrusion  
 Plan 1: Supervisor/lead worker collects when ready to 
report 
 
 2. Query workers on intrusion occurrence Plan 1.2. If no intrusion 
occurred, skip to end 
 3. Contact worker(s) who detected intrusion  
 4. Record relevant information for reporting 
 
Plan 1.4. If detecting worker is 
reporting, they should record 
the following steps 
1.4. Record relevant information for reporting  
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 1.4.1. Verify if crash occurred Plan 1.4.1. If crash occurred, 
mark that an intrusion occurred 
and connect to crash report 
 1.4.2. Verify severity of risk to crew Plan 1.4.2. If risk moderate to 
high, identify if evasive 
maneuvers took place 
 1.4.3. Record layout, environment (lighting and 
weather), location, time, road condition, operation type, 
salience, and vehicle type/maneuver 
 
 1.4.4. Collect evidence of intrusion 
(pictures/video/documents) 
 
2. Report intrusion  
 Plan 1: Reporter should skip this step if no intrusion 
occurred 
 
 2. Log into reporting system (i.e., TAMS)  
 3. Mark that an intrusion occurred for a hard count  
 4. Indicate worker(s) detecting intrusion  
 5. Mark location, layout, and operation type Plan 2.5.1. Mark these if 
reporting system does not 
automatically populate the 
fields based on prior records 
 6. Enter time and date of intrusion Plan 2.6. If exact time is 
unknown, enter estimated time 
range 
 7. Indicate weather, lighting, and road conditions during 
intrusion 
Plan 2.7. If weather is sunny or 
clear, mark whether glare 
conditions were present 
 8. Indicate the degree of risk to the road crew Plan 2.8. If risk was higher than 
minimal, indicate whether 
workers had to engage in 
evasive maneuvers 
 9. Indicate whether the intrusion involved a flagger  
 10. Indicate intruding vehicle type and observed 
maneuvers 
Plan 2.10. Skip if unknown 
 
2.1.3 Human Factors Issues 
The primary human factors issues providing a barrier to reporting intrusions include: time stress, risk 
perception, mental workload and complexity, and organizational issues. Time stress is present as the 
crew and those potentially reporting intrusions are already doing many other required tasks, and time 
spent reporting an intrusion must be weighed against the benefits of performing another task. This goes 
in hand with risk perception, as the risk of an accident to personnel may be estimated by the worker to 
be low in the event of a minor intrusion. When estimated personal risk is low, effort is typically not 
allocated to further reducing the risk (Wickens, 2014). This means that effort may not be spent to report 
minor intrusions. 
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Effort may also not be made if the interface is complex and demanding. Information from the interviews 
suggested that some required forms are complicated and require significant time and mental 
investment to complete accurately. If the intrusion form is similarly complex, requiring significant time 
investment, only the most salient and dangerous intrusions may be reported. Therefore, the design 
must focus on making intrusion reporting simple and short, while capturing as much data as is relevant 
for MnDOT. 
Finally, there may be some organizational and safety culture issues centering on communication about 
the use of data. Effort spent reporting intrusions may be wasted from the perspective of crew, reporting 
intrusions is not yet seen as a good safety practice that has beneficial downstream effects.  If this is to 
happen, these potential downstream effects on analysis or policy should be made salient to the crew, to 
help them feel included and involved in the process. 
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CHAPTER 3:  INITIAL INTERFACE PROTOTYPE AND USER TESTING 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
After reviewing information gathered from the previous tasks, the research team created an initial 
prototype of a work zone intrusion report and began user-testing it with relevant personnel across the 
state, following standard protocol for usability testing (Jordan, 2002). From these tests, the prototype 
was revised iteratively, resulting in a more complete design to be used in beta testing. 
3.1.1 Initial Interface Design 
The research team reviewed the materials from the human factors analysis, which comprised of 
interviews with work zone supervisors and MnDOT central personnel, and created an initial interface 
incorporating the elements derived from the task analysis presented from Figure 3.1 to Figure 3.4. This 
design utilized the Justinmind prototyping tool (https://www.justinmind.com), which allowed for testing 
of the interface and interaction elements as if it were a website or app usable in real-time. The initial 
design had four screens and was initially planned to be integrated into the TAMS asset management 
system, therefore the design was made to mimic the TAMS interface. Further, multiple data elements 
were initially assumed to be derived from the TAMS work order. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Initial Reporting Interface, First Screen. 
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Figure 3.2 Initial Reporting Interface, Second Screen. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Initial Reporting Interface, Third Screen. 
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Figure 3.4 Initial Reporting Interface, Final Screen. 
3.1.2 User Testing 
The usability testing protocol is presented in Appendix A. The protocol had supervisors and workers that 
performed maintenance duties generate the details of a well-remembered intrusion scenario and 
indicate which elements of the generated scenario they would most like to be reported to MnDOT. The 
data elements of these scenarios were included into successive iterations of the prototype design, 
including vehicle and driver characteristics such as color and suspected driver state. The researchers 
asked users to input the generated scenario into the interface, along with four researcher-written 
scenarios that were previously validated by work zone supervisors for face validity (see Appendix A). 
Workers were asked to “think aloud” as they interacted with the interface to provide feedback about 
any positive or confusing features of the workflow and system design. The researchers recorded 
significant comments about the interface, along with the time it took to complete the report. Following 
the mock data entry activities, the System Usability Scale (SUS; Brooke, 1986) was given to the users to 
allow them to report their perceived satisfaction with the interface. This data provided a quantitative 
assessment of the usability of the initial and revised prototypes (Appendix B). Finally, a series of 
interview questions were used to identify positive elements of the interface and possible areas for 
improvement. 
Researchers tested six potential users of the intrusion reporting form across Minnesota’s truck stations, 
including Maple Grove, Cedar Avenue, and Bemidji. This sampling allowed the research team to capture 
19 
input from both metro and rural locations. After each session, the interface was modified to reflect the 
input from the supervisors and workers. 
3.1.2.1 Testing Results 
The average time for completion of a scenario was just over 5 minutes (M = 5 minutes, 5.08 seconds), 
with a standard deviation of 68.35 seconds, with all users noting that with repeated exposure they felt 
they would be able to complete the form even more quickly. The System Usability Scale (SUS) of the 
interface were 80, 85, 87.5, 92.5, 62.5, and 90 with an average of 82.92 (SD = 10.89). Scores between 60 
and 70 reflect an average interface for usability, while scores higher than 70 reflect an increasingly more 
user-friendly design. The scores for the interface suggest that the design for the work zone intrusion 
form were highly usable for most participants. 
The most popular aspect of the interface were the drop-down menus, which allowed for ease of 
selection and rapid completion of the reports for each intrusion scenario. Most of the changes to the 
interface involved using the appropriate language and terminology with which workers and supervisors 
were most familiar. Workers reported a desire to document any vehicle information they observed from 
the intrusion first to limit any memory decay, rather than reporting vehicle information after querying 
other information, like location details. Further, workers reported a desire to document intrusions 
shortly after they occurred, on the work site.  
When asked how likely they would be to use this system to report intrusion, if it were available, each 
user expressed with certainty that they would use it, but that was contingent upon several stipulations:  
 The interface had to be available on-site, 
 The interface was easy to quickly open, and  
 Employees needed to feel like the data they were entering was going to actually be seen and 
analyzed.  
The general reasons for the stipulations were that employees, supervisors especially, felt they already 
spent too much time having to fill out reports and that they only way they would be willing to fill out 
more reports were if they were quick and easy. They liked that a digital reporting system made it much 
more likely that the information they were reporting would be seen by someone rather than just filed 
away as they perceived paper reports were. 
3.1.3 First Redesign of Reporting Interface  
The completed iterative redesign of the interface is presented in Figure 3.5, Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7, Figure 
3.8, Figure 3.9, and Figure 3.10. After discussion, the design was decoupled from the TAMS interface and 
conceptualized as a standalone website interface to ensure smooth functionality and access across 
potential users such as supervisors and work zone site forepersons. This decision was largely made from 
two main research findings. First, a heuristic analysis of the existing TAMS interface suggests that users 
will have a poor user experience with the system. For instance, the data entry fields lack clear 
organization, grouping, or flow. Moreover, some design features, such as the size of the buttons for the 
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drop-down menus are inappropriately small and would not meet basic accessibility standards or lend 
well to any touchscreen interaction on a tablet PC. Ultimately, integrating the intrusion report into the 
TAMS software appears to be counter to the goals of this project, which are to create a user-friendly 
interface that will promote, not hinder, quality data collection regarding intrusions. Second, users’ 
strong preference for being able to document intrusions at the work site, just after an intrusion occurs, 
may be hindered by poor access to the TAMS system remotely or by all workers. With the primary focus 
of this project being to increase the reporting of work zone intrusions, users were asked roughly how 
many reportable intrusions they witnessed per day on their shift. Workers all noted that it depended on 
the type of road work being done as well as location, but on average they saw about one reportable 
intrusion per day. It is important to note that this does not technically include all work zone intrusions, 
but rather the types of intrusions that they viewed as reportable. Of the six workers who were 
interviewed, five reported that if a car were to intrude into a work zone but not damage any property, 
equipment, or interrupt the work that was being done, they would be unlikely to report it. The 
frequency of the intrusions occurring coupled with the worker’s assertion that reporting of these events 
would only happen if it were a quick and user-friendly interface necessitated a design that was 
consistent with the thought patterns of the events from the workers point of view. 
The flow of information was reassessed to address users’ requests to document vehicle features at the 
beginning of the reporting process. After employing a card sorting procedure, the interface flow was re-
framed as an “inside-out” reporting system, beginning with the intruding vehicle, next to work zone site 
characteristics, location, and then administrative information. This flow was employed to better fit the 
worker and supervisor mental model of an intrusion and how they think about reporting. This resulted 
in the addition of a new screen, along with more user-friendly terminology (e.g., temporary and 
permanent lane closure, ICR #, etc.). The most recent iterative design features a five-screen interface 
with a sixth “completion” screen, which provides users feedback that they have successfully submitted 
their report.  
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Figure 3.5 Revised Reporting Interface, First Screen. 
 
Figure 3.6 Revised Reporting Interface, Second Screen. 
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Figure 3.7 Revised Reporting Interface, Third Screen. 
 
Figure 3.8 Revised Reporting Interface, Fourth Screen. 
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Figure 3.9 Revised Reporting Interface, Fifth Screen. 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Revised Reporting Interface, Submission Screen. 
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The interface design specs were provided to the software programmer and implemented into a beta test 
version for further testing and revision. Finally, a paper form was created to mirror the information 
presentation and flow of the electronic interface. While the research findings strongly support the use of 
an electronic reporting system, a back-up paper form was considered necessary to provide an 
alternative means of work zone intrusion documentation in the absence of an electronic device. The 
paper form (see Figure 3.11), was later user-tested and modified based on feedback. 
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Figure 3.11 Initial Paper Prototype for Intrusion Report  
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CHAPTER 4:  BETA TESTING AND ITERATIVE DESIGNS 
4.1 OVERVIEW 
After testing an interface prototype for supervisors to report work zone intrusions online, and 
constructing a beta system of the interface prototype, HumanFIRST researchers began testing this beta 
system with users. This beta testing was done to further refine the design of the intrusion reporting 
system and test how it works in a setting more similar to real-world scenarios. This chapter describes 
the initial design, testing methods, results, and iterative re-designs. 
The initial implemented beta design closely resembled the revised design of the interface prototype 
reported in Chapter 3. This beta was dissociated from the TAMS system to ensure that it was portable 
and not constrained by any possible usability limitations of TAMS. The beta site was stored on a 
personal university website and comprised of six webpages, five of which comprised the reporting 
interface and a sixth page notifying users of a successful submission. Each page in the report includes 
multiple drop-down menus and manual entry items allowing supervisors to report informative details 
about the work zone intrusion. 
4.1.1 Initial Beta Design User Testing  
The usability testing protocol is presented in Appendix A. It consists of an introductory period where the 
system and testing procedure was explained. Instead of using the user-generated scenarios as 
previously done, videos of real intrusions captured on camera by MnDOT were used. The volunteering 
supervisor would watch a video of an intrusion in a Minnesota work zone, and fill out the report using 
the beta system. The time to completion for reporting the intrusions in the first two videos was 
recorded to measure both intuitiveness and learnability of the beta. During the third video report, the 
supervisor was asked to verbalize his or her thoughts on the beta system, to assess preferences and 
mental processes as he or she used the system. Afterwards, three questionnaires were administered, 
including the System Usability Scale (Appendix B), the Rating Scale Mental Effort (Appendix C) and a 
researcher designed questionnaire titled “Intrusion Form Survey” about the beta system (Appendix D). 
Finally, a series of free-response questions were asked (Appendix A). The testing procedure was 
iterative, therefore, after every testing session, the researchers would evaluate the results and update 
the design of the beta system accordingly. 
For the videos, the researchers used camera footage supplied by MnDOT. The three videos used 
different work zone types (i.e., ramp closure, shoulder work), two on Interstate 35W South, and one on 
Highway 36. The first intrusion was minor, involving no risk to any crewmembers. The second intrusion 
was moderate in the risk to crewmembers, while the third was quite high regarding the risk level to the 
maintenance crew on site. Researchers tested four potential users of the intrusion reporting form. The 
supervisors reflected urban and suburban areas in Minnesota, and worked day and night shifts. 
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4.1.1.1 Initial Beta User Testing Results 
The average time for completion of the first report was 6 minutes and 18 seconds. The average time for 
completion of the second report was 3 minutes and 9.3 seconds. The first report time reflects moderate 
to high intuitiveness of the beta interface. While ideally it would initially take under 5 minutes to 
complete, taking a little over six minutes reflects an acceptable time investment. Furthermore, the 
learnability of the beta system was high, as the second time to complete was considerably lower at 
approximately 3 minutes. Reporters easily figured out the system and rapidly filled out the report with 
the beta system on their second use. 
The System Usability Scale (SUS) scores of the interface was fairly good, as scores between 60 and 70 
represent average system usability, and the average SUS scores for the beta was 86.875 (SD = 13.288). 
RSME scores measuring self-reported mental effort reflected an average of 36.25 (SD = 7.5), which 
indicates a degree of mental demand between “some”, and “a little”, which reflects satisfactorily low 
demand imposed by the beta. 
The Intrusion Form Survey averages are reported in Table 4.1, with the first three questions scored on a 
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) scale, and the last question scored on a multiple choice (7-
point) option of: Worst Imaginable, Awful, Poor, Ok, Good, Excellent, and Best Imaginable. 
Table 4.1 Intrusion Form Survey Scores 
 Average Standard Deviation 
Information Entered Accurately 3.75 0.50 
Confidence While Using Form 4.50 0.58 
Interface Has Annoying Features 2.25 0.50 
Overall User-Friendliness 5.50 0.58 
 
As reflected in Table 4.1, supervisors were moderately confident in the accuracy of the information 
entered in the form, and highly confident in their ability to complete the form. Most users reported 
relatively low annoyance with the form, although there may be room for improvement in later designs. 
Finally, overall user-friendliness was highly rated, the average score somewhere between “Good” (score 
of 5) and “Excellent” (score of 6). 
The most popular aspects of the interface were the drop-down menus and the comprehensiveness of 
the form. This allows for quick use of the form and the ability to enter in and report most useful points 
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of data about a work zone intrusion. The least popular aspects was whether it would be reasonable to 
use the form for minor intrusions that supervisors did not consider a risk to crew, especially if the 
supervisor could not fill out a form on site with a portable electronic device (e.g., iPad, tablet). Multiple 
supervisors noted their discomfort with reporting whether they thought the intruding vehicle was 
committing a speed limit violation, as they did not feel confident they would be able to report speed 
limit violations accurately. This issue may need to be revisited. Some supervisors also reported wanting 
a clear explanation of the rationale for the form when the final version is rolled out, to provide 
motivation for filling out reports on work zone intrusions, especially minor ones. 
4.1.1.2 Initial Beta Revisions 
There were several changes and adjustments made to the beta from its original design. A number of 
these changes are described in the following Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Minor Initial Revisions to Beta Design 
Website 
Interface 
Changed “MnDOT 
User ID” to 
“Employee ID”, 
which is a 
consistent and 
permanent 
identification 
number. 
Certain fields were 
made not mandatory 
to provide ease in 
completing the 
report in case of 
incomplete 
information. 
Work Request 
Number was 
changed to Work 
Order Number to 
reflect common 
terminology with the 
TAMS system. 
Administrative Unit 
was changed to 
District Unit to 
reflect consistent 
MnDOT 
terminology. 
 District Unit was 
made into a drop-
down menu with 
the following items: 
(CO, D1, D2, D3, 
D4, D6, D7, D8, 
METRO). 
Location Route 
changed to Location 
Route Number, and 
Mile Post Number 
changed to Location 
Description. 
Auto filling multiple 
options with 
“Unknown” to 
improve efficiency of 
filling out the form as 
often some of the 
details of the 
intrusion will not be 
known. 
 
Paper 
Interface 
“MnDOT ID” was 
changed to 
“MnDOT Employee 
ID”. 
Administrative Unit 
was changed to 
District Unit 
Work Request 
Number was 
changed to Work 
Order Number 
Crew Witnessed 
was changed to 
Original 
Witness(es) 
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The initial revisions to the beta design were implemented prior to a significant revision. The layout of 
the initial revisions are presented in Figure 4.1 through Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.1 Revised Beta Interface, First Screen. 
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Figure 4.2 Revised Beta Interface, Second Screen. 
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Figure 4.3 Revised Beta Interface, Third Screen. 
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Figure 4.4 Revised Beta Interface, Fourth Screen. 
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Figure 4.5 Revised Beta Interface, Fifth Screen. 
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Figure 4.6 Revised Beta Interface, Sixth Screen. 
 
4.2 MAJOR REVISED DESIGN AND TESTING 
The research team at HumanFIRST followed up the initial redesigns to the beta website and paper 
prototype with (1) a major revision to the reporting logic by splitting up the report into an immediate 
“minor” report, and a more comprehensive “major” intrusion report, and (2) user testing the modal 
effects of the reporting interface by utilizing the usability protocol (Appendix A) and videos with a 
laptop, a tablet, and the paper form. Researchers tested the three versions of the intrusion reporting 
form interfaces with three technical advisory panel employees. 
The first page of the website version now contained three drop-down menus regarding the severity of 
the intrusion. Beneath these drop-down’s is a notice to users filling out the report that if they select 
no/none to all three options regarding the intrusion severity, they may submit the form immediately. 
This was done to allow users to quickly fill out a brief report for minor intrusions that contain the basic 
location, date, and narrative information. A similar change was made and is reflected in the paper form 
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as well. This major change was implemented due to repeated comments by users that they would be 
unlikely to report minor intrusions unless the reporting requirements were very brief and efficient. 
4.2.1 Second Beta Design User Testing 
Table 4.3 shows the average results of the System Usability Scale (SUS) for all three interfaces on the 
newly redesigned layout, as well as the Rating Scale Mental Effort (RSME), and the average time to 
complete the task for each interface. There was little difference between the laptop and paper form, 
while the tablet took users an average of over two minutes longer to complete relative to the laptop and 
paper form. All users indicated that they felt their completion time would decrease significantly for all 
three forms once they had used them again.  
The System Usability Scale (SUS) scores of the interface was generally good, as scores between 60 and 
70 represent average system usability, with the SUS scores for the laptop version of the form was 71.67 
(SD = 3.21). The laptop version also received the lowest RSME scores measuring self-reported mental 
effort reflected an average of 38 (SD = 7.21), which indicates a degree of mental demand between 
“some”, and “a little”, which reflects satisfactorily low demand imposed by the beta version of the 
electronic report. 
Table 4.3 Average Satisfaction & Mental Workload Scores 
 Laptop Tablet Paper Form 
SUS 71.67 63.33 65 
RSME 38 54 46.5 
Completion Time (min.) 5:30  7:22 5:27 
The Intrusion Form Survey averages are reported in Table 4.4, with the first three questions scored on a 
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) scale, and the last question scored on a multiple choice (7-
point) option of: Worst Imaginable, Awful, Poor, Ok, Good, Excellent, and Best Imaginable. 
Table 4.4 Intrusion Form Survey Scores for Multiple Interface Types 
 Laptop Tablet Paper 
1. Information Entered Accurately 4.5 4 4 
2. Confidence While Using Form 4.5 4 4 
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3. Interface Has Annoying Features 3 2.5 1 
4. Overall User-Friendliness 5.5 5 6 
As reflected in Table 4.4, users were moderately confident in both the accuracy of the information 
entered in their ability to complete the form for all three interfaces. Most users reported relatively low 
annoyance with the form, although there may still be more room for improvement in later designs. 
Finally, overall user-friendliness was highly rated, with the average score somewhere between “Good” 
(score of 5) and “Excellent” (score of 6) for all three interfaces. 
The most popular aspects of the interface were the drop-down menus, the comprehensiveness of the 
form, and the ability to quickly report a minor intrusion that did not require users to fill out the entire 
form. This allows for quick use of the form and the ability to enter in and report most useful points of 
data about a work zone intrusion. The least popular aspects were regarding the duration it took to 
complete the form as well as the likelihood that on-site workers would complete the form for minor 
intrusions. There were also several interfaces design issues for the tablet version of the form regarding 
the tablet keyboard blocking the input fields. 
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CHAPTER 5:  FINAL DESIGN AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 OVERVIEW 
After testing the beta version of the website and paper intrusion forms with work zone employees and 
supervisors and making another round of changes to the form based on user feedback, HumanFIRST 
researchers began testing the final version of the form with users. This final phase of testing was done to 
further refine the design of the intrusion reporting system and test how it works in settings more similar 
to real-world scenarios. This chapter describes the final design, testing methods, results, and 
recommendations.  
The final version of the design was similar to the beta version with minor changes to the layout and 
wording of the content. The final version of the electronic form was stored on a private university 
website and comprised of seven webpages, six of which comprised the reporting interface and a seventh 
page notifying users of a successful submission. Each page in the report includes multiple drop-down 
menus and manual entry items allowing supervisors to report informative details about the work zone 
intrusion. Some of the entry fields were required for submission. All of these fields had markers that 
indicated they were required and users were not able to submit the form until all of the required fields 
were completed. 
5.1.1 Final Design and User Testing  
The protocol used in the final version of the testing was identical to the second beta testing of the form. 
The usability testing protocol is presented in Appendix A. It consisted of an introductory period where 
the system and testing procedure was explained. Instead of using the user-generated scenarios as done 
previously, videos of real intrusions captured on camera by MnDOT were used. The volunteering 
workers then watched a video of an intrusion in a Minnesota work zone and filled out the report using 
the final system. For each video, users completed the form using one of three methods: a paper version, 
a laptop with a mouse, or a Dell tablet used by MnDOT employees. The time to completion for reporting 
the intrusions recorded to measure both intuitiveness and learnability of the final design. Afterwards, 
three questionnaires were administered, including the System Usability Scale (Appendix B), the Rating 
Scale Mental Effort (Appendix C) and a researcher designed questionnaire titled “Intrusion Form Survey” 
about the beta (Appendix D). Finally, a series of free-response questions were asked (Appendix A).  
For the videos, the researchers used the previously administered camera footage supplied by MnDOT 
(see section 4.1.1). These three videos featured a minor, moderate, and severe intrusion reflecting 
urban and suburban areas in both day and night shifts. Researchers tested three potential users of the 
intrusion reporting form. 
5.1.1.1 Final Design User Testing Results 
The average time for completion of the report using the paper version was 5 minutes and 17 seconds. 
The average time for completion of the report using the website version on a laptop was 5 minutes and 
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42 seconds. The average time for completion of the report using the website version on a tablet was 6 
minutes and 24 seconds. While ideally it would initially take under 5 minutes to complete, taking a five 
to six minutes reflects an acceptable time investment. Furthermore, the learnability of the system was 
high, each user got faster after each time they completed the form, regardless of the order, was 
indicative of the overall intuitiveness of the forms, with users averaging under 5 minutes each for the 
final form they completed, regardless of whether it was using paper, laptop, or tablet. Users reported 
easily figuring out the system and rapidly filled out the report on their final use. 
The System Usability Scale (SUS) scores of the interface was fairly good, as scores between 60 and 70 
represent average system usability, and the average SUS scores for the beta system was 86.875 (SD = 
13.288). RSME scores measuring self-reported mental effort reflected an average of 36.25 (SD = 7.5), 
which indicates a degree of mental demand between “some”, and “a little”, which reflects satisfactorily 
low demand imposed by the beta system. 
The Intrusion Form Survey averages are reported in Table 5.1, with the first three questions scored on a 
1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) scale, and the last question scored on a multiple choice (7-
point) option of: Worst Imaginable, Awful, Poor, Ok, Good, Excellent, and Best Imaginable. 
Table 5.1 Intrusion Form Survey Scores for Multiple Interface Types 
 Paper Laptop Tablet 
Information Entered Accurately 4.67 4.33 4.33 
Confidence While Using Form 4.33 4 3.67 
Interface Has Annoying Features 2 2 2.33 
Overall User-Friendliness 5 4.67 4.67 
As reflected in Table 5.1, supervisors were moderately confident in the accuracy of the information 
entered in the form for all three interfaces, and highly confident in their ability to complete the form, 
also for all three interfaces, although they consistently rated the tablet version, the slowest for 
completion time, as their least preferred of the three (see Table 5.2). Most users reported relatively low 
annoyance with the form. Finally, overall user-friendliness was highly rated, the average score for all 
three forms being at or close to “Good” (score of 5). 
The most popular aspects of the interface were the drop-down menus, the comprehensiveness of the 
form, and the ability to quickly report a basic intrusion (one that did not involve any evasive maneuvers 
by crew or risk to the crewmembers on-site) that did not require users to fill out the entire form. This 
allows for quick use of the form and the ability to enter in and report most useful points of data about a 
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work zone intrusion. One of the least popular aspects were regarding the duration it took to complete 
the form, although users widely indicated they thought they would be able to complete it much faster 
after a couple times through the form, especially for the “Basic Report.” Users also reported that they 
were skeptical of the likelihood that on-site workers would complete the form for basic or minor 
intrusions. There were also several interfaces design issues for the tablet version of the form regarding 
the tablet keyboard blocking the input fields when it is used in the landscape mode. These issues do not 
arise when the tablet is in portrait mode, however, which is the mode users indicated they felt they 
would typically use it when filling out the report. 
Table 5.2 Average Satisfaction & Mental Workload Scores 
 Laptop Tablet Paper Form 
SUS 70.33 61 78.67 
RSME 29.67 38 20.67 
Completion Time (min.) 5:42 6:24 5:17 
5.1.1.2 Final Design Revisions 
There were several changes and adjustments made to the final version from the beta design. A number 
of these changes are described in the following Table 5.3. Screenshots of the final version are presented 
in Table 5.1 through Table 5.3. The final paper version of the interface is presented in Figure 5.4. The 
final online interface is, at the time of writing this report, was hosted on a private server and files made 
available to the sponsor. 
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Table 5.3 Minor Revisions to Final Design 
Website 
Interface 
Changed the title of 
the tab from “Minor 
Report” to “Basic 
Intrusion Report”, 
which was meant to 
make it more 
intuitive to users 
that if there was no 
risk to crew, further 
information was not 
required. 
Changed the title of 
the tab “Intrusion 
Basic Report” to 
“Vehicle Events”, 
which was meant to 
make the tab title 
more intuitive and 
not confusing 
relative to the 
change of the first 
tab name. 
Changed the button 
titles from “Submit 
Minor Report” and 
“Submit Major 
Report” to “Submit 
Basic Report” and 
“Submit Full 
Report,” 
respectively. 
Certain fields 
were made 
mandatory for 
the full report 
to ensure 
enough 
information 
was collected 
to properly 
analyze the 
intrusion. 
 Added more options 
to several fields for 
more accurate and 
detailed reporting of 
events 
Changed the 
location of several 
field items to better 
reflect the flow of 
thought of the user 
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Figure 5.1 Final Interface, Basic Report Screen. 
 
42 
 
Figure 5.2 Final Interface, Full Report First Screen. 
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Figure 5.3 Final Interface, Full Report Fourth Screen. 
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Figure 5.4 Final Paper Interface, First Page. 
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Figure 5.5 Final Paper Interface, Second Page. 
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5.2 FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our final recommendations are segmented into three categories: 1) direct implementation issues, 2) 
near-future human-system integration, and 3) organizational engagement. Direct implementation 
relates to immediate items that MnDOT and MNIT should consider while converting the research 
prototype intrusion reporting system built by HumanFIRST. Near-future human-system integration 
issues reflects the ongoing task and design considerations as MnDOT deploys the system. Organizational 
engagement centers around how the central office could best coordinate and communicate with 
supervisors and workers on the field to make the reporting dynamic successful. 
5.2.1 Direct Implementation 
There are two primary issues and one minor issue that MnDOT and MNIT should be aware of while 
converting the reporting system for use by MnDOT. First, the converted system should be quality 
assurance tested with all browsers, especially Internet Explorer, to ensure functionality before 
deployment. Second, the uploading options for incident diagrams, pictures, and video in the current 
build by HumanFIRST are placeholders due to security reasons for the University of Minnesota. The 
research platform created for data storage demonstration is in an unsecured website. No files are 
allowed to be uploaded at present time for this reason. When implemented for MnDOT user, security 
would be handled internally to ensure data privacy is appropriately addressed, and the uploading 
capabilities should be made functional by MnDOT and MNIT. Finally, there is a minor limitation on the 
Work Zone Information page in the online reporting form: the work zone type, and traffic control 
present option are currently only multi-selectable by pressing CTRL + the left mouse button. This places 
a limitation on full use of the multi-selectable function by touchscreen or tablet users. Further coding 
should be done to make the options multi-selectable by pressing the data attribute option and having 
that option remain selected unless deliberately de-selected by having the user press the same option 
again. 
5.2.2 Human-System Integration 
A primary selling point of using the online or digital interface is that it should be easy and quick to access 
in the field, allowing a supervisor or crew leader on site to rapidly report a work zone intrusion and 
resume primary job duties. Furthermore, some supervisors thought that digital data might get more 
attention from analysts than paper data that “collects dust in a locked storage room”. Therefore, ease of 
access and analysis are moderate selling points for the new system, and an effort should be made to 
actually make the reporting system easily accessible on tablets and other portable electronic devices in 
the field.  In addition, as the system is deployed, the responsible office should continue to consider how 
to best implement the intrusion reporting process in the everyday workflow of supervisors, so that even 
if the intrusion is not reported immediately, there is part of the supervisor routine in which they are 
prompted to report any intrusion that occurred that workday. 
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5.2.3 Organizational Engagement  
Reporting work zone intrusions, especially minor ones, is seen as a low priority by many supervisors and 
workers, as “just another report for the pencil-pushers that doesn’t change anything”. Given that they 
consider reporting minor intrusions as low priority, if MnDOT wants reliable and consistent intrusion 
reporting, an effort to engage work zone supervisors and crewmembers in the benefits, consequences, 
and decision-making process is essential to the success of the intrusion reporting system. 
Communication should be made on a widespread and consistent basis about the current and recent 
data on intrusions, the data trends, and what changes are being made as a result of the intrusion 
reporting. 
Given this, the office or team responsible for managing the intrusion reporting data should have at least 
three areas of focus with a different team member handling each area:  
1. Intrusion data and how it should impact state and local government policy,  
2. Intrusion data and how it should influence MnDOT policy on work zone use and design, and  
3. Supervisor and crewmember coordination and outreach.  
Through the creation of an organizational structure and plan regarding the received work zone intrusion 
data, MnDOT can design a plan around the data, propose policy at the state level, consider current work 
practices, and communicate to work zone crews how their reporting is having a real impact. 
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 APPENDIX A 
WORK ZONE INTRUSION PROTOCOL #1 
 
A-1 
Introduction 
 Thank you for meeting with us today 
 Brief explanation about work zone intrusions 
 Brief explanation about how our role is to communicate their needs and wants back to the state 
Tasks 
 Today we are going to have you complete 2 tasks 
o Which is faster, writing or typing? 
 First, we would like you to write down (or type up) a detailed story about a real work zone 
intrusion that you can remember well and would be likely to report if it occurred if there were 
an easy option to do so. Describe the important details about the work zone setup (e.g. lane 
closure, vehicle convoy, traffic control setup & removal) Try to be as detailed as possible about 
the information that you do remember regarding the vehicles actions, and any evasive action by 
the crew. Also, try to include any information you can recall about the weather and road 
conditions. 
o Now that you have written out the intrusion account you’ve experienced, please 
underline (or highlight) what information in the story you think would be important 
details you would want reported to your truck station, MnDOT, and and/or other 
authorities? 
 Next, we are going to read to you a few brief scenarios about a work zone intrusion. After we 
have read each report, we would like you to fill out the intrusion report with the prototype 
interface. We would like to encourage you to please think aloud as you fill out the form and 
provide any verbal feedback you can think of regarding your thought process and expectations 
or concerns as you fill the form out.  
o Each scenario will be filled out as its own report, multiple intrusions not implemented 
yet 
o This is to be implemented with TAMs, so it will be part of a work order, so some details 
will already be included, such as a Username and Work Zone location 
Scenarios 
1. Flagger in daytime, SUV, angry driver, intrudes near taper/merge, evasive maneuvers by flagger, 
driver skips queue. 
“Donald Morrison is the flagger for a daytime work zone site on a straight level one-way road. He 
reports to you that yesterday afternoon around 2:00 PM he was flagging a series of cars to wait and 
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form a queue. A driver in an SUV pulled up to the front of the line, yelled at him, and deliberately 
maneuvers around him, skipping the queue to continue driving into the work zone. It was a cloudy day 
with normal road conditions and the local speed limit was 40 mph.” 
2. Driver enters activity area, swerves to avoid sideswipe, in active work zone. Debris in road, glare 
conditions. Driver merges back into roadway.  
“Gregory Wise is a crewman in a lane closure work zone on a left curving uphill two-way undivided road 
near a stoplight. He reports to you that today, in the morning, he saw a driver of a small car swerve to 
avoid another car about to sideswipe and hit it, and because of this swerve, the car entered an activity 
area and an active work zone. There was debris in the roadway as well as quite bad glare conditions on a 
sunny day. The driver then left the activity area and merged back onto the roadway. “ 
3. Driver moves in-between mobile convoy at night, rainy weather, swerving a little, perhaps 
inattentive or drunk. Driver moves off into exit ramp. 
“Issac Patrick drives part of a mobile operation. He reports to you that a driver moved in-between the 
operation (the gore point) at night during rainy weather. The driver was swerving a little and was 
perhaps drunk or being inattentive. Shortly after, the driver moved out from the convoy and off into an 
exit ramp. The speed limit in the area was 35 mph.” 
4. Unseen intrusion. Knocked over cones and skid marks, on a long straight rural road. Late night 
clear weather conditions. 
“Coming to the work zone in the morning, you find that a series of barrels along a long, straight, four 
lane rural highway that are blocking off a lane have been knocked over, as well as tire skid marks near 
the end of the disturbed barrels in the middle of the termination area, where a vehicle seems to have 
veered back onto the roadway. There was clear weather the night before, and road conditions seemed 
normal.” 
Closing Interview 
 Administer SUS and any other potential surveys 
 Closing Interview 
o “Thank you for completing the intrusion reports. We would like to hear from you your 
experience using the prototype reporting interface. We want to hear your thoughts so 
we can design the most user-friendly interaction possible.” 
o Possible Questions for the guided interview 
 
1. What elements of the interface worked well for you, that we may want to keep? 
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2. What part of the interface or task did you find frustrating or hard to do? 
3. Did you have any problems with the organization of the interface, where things were? 
4. What elements should we include in the next version of the interface? Are we missing 
things we should have in the report? 
5. If an intrusion occurred but nothing was damaged and no one was hurt, how likely do 
you think you would be to report it if this form was available to you. Why or why not? 
6. In your experience, about how many work zone intrusions (may need to specify again 
what we consider intrusions) would you estimate occur a day? Does it seem to vary 
based on the location (rural vs. urban vs. highway)? 
7. In your experience, what seems to be the most common type of work zone intrusion? 
Why do you think that is? 
8. Do you have any other thoughts about the interface or the possibility of beginning to 
report and record work zone intrusions? 
How would you define a work zone intrusion? What would be the threshold to classify an intrusion as 
something “reportable”? 
 
 APPENDIX B 
SYSTEM USABILITY SCALE (SUS) 
 
 
B-1 
               Strongly          Strongly  
                 disagree            agree 
1. I think that I would like to  
   use this system frequently  
     
2. I found the system unnecessarily 
   complex 
     
 
3. I thought the system was easy 
   to use                        
 
 
4. I think that I would need the 
   support of a technical person to 
   be able to use this system  
 
 
5. I found the various functions in 
   this system were well integrated 
     
 
6. I thought there was too much 
   inconsistency in this system 
     
 
7. I would imagine that most people 
   would learn to use this system 
   very quickly    
 
8. I found the system very 
   cumbersome to use 
    
 
9. I felt very confident using the   
   system 
 
10. I needed to learn a lot of 
   things before I could get going 
   with this system    
 
  
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5  
 APPENDIX C 
RATING SCALE MENTAL EFFORT (RSME) 
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 APPENDIX D 
INTRUSION FORM SURVEY 
  
D-1 
For each of the following questions, place an “X” through the one number to indicate your 
response.   
“1” for strongly disagree, “3” for neutral- neither agree nor disagree, “5” for strongly agree. 
 
 
1. I was accurate with the information I entered on this interface 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly Agree 
     
 
2. I felt confident completing this form 
  
     
 
3. This interface had some annoying features 
 
     
 
4. Overall, I would rate the user-friendliness of this device: 
o Worst Imaginable 
o Awful 
o Poor 
o Ok 
o Good 
o Excellent 
o Best Imaginable 
 
